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Abstract
Major shortcomings in a recently published group key establish-
ment protocol are described. These shortcomings are sufficiently seri-
ous that the protocol should not be used.
1 Introduction
Harn and Hsu [2] recently published a protocol designed to provide authen-
ticated group key establishment. In this brief note we describe a number
of serious security issues with this scheme; in particular it does not provide
the properties claimed.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 defines the
protocol, including the intended context of use. Section 3 then describes a
number of serious issues with the protocol. The paper concludes in section 4.
2 The Harn-Hsu key establishment protocol
2.1 Context and goals
The protocol is intended for use by a pre-established community of users, and
enables any subset (group) of this community to agree on a shared secret
key, where this secret key can be chosen and distributed by any member
of the community. Group key establishment protocols have been widely
discussed in the literature for many years — see, for example, chapter 6
of Boyd and Mathuria [1]. Indeed, the area is so well-established that an
ISO/IEC standard for group key establishment [4] was published back in
2011.
The threat model for such protocols varies, but typically the goal is
that, after completion of the protocol, all participants agree on the same
key, they know it is ‘fresh’, and that no parties other than those intended
learn anything about the key.
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As far as the protocol described by Harn and Hsu [2] is concerned, the
following statements are made regarding its intended use and properties.
• ‘In our protocol, each member needs a pair of long-term DH [Diffie-
Hellman] private and public keys and the long-term DH public key has
been digitally signed by a trusted Certificate Authority (CA)’.
• ‘The group key is determined by an initiator of the group communica-
tion and broadcasts the group key to all group members. The initiator
can be any member in a group communication. Each group key is used
for only one communication session. When a new group communica-
tion session is established, a new group key will be generated by an
initiator’. From this statement (and the use of ‘long-term’) it is clear
that the DH private and public keys are intended for use to establish
many group keys.
• ’The digital certificate of public keys of group members will be used
by an initiator to assure that the group key can only be decrypted
by legitimate group members but not by any non-members’. This
establishes a key goal of the protocol, i.e. to ensure that the established
key is only available to the parties intended by the initiator.
Section 2.2 of Harn and Hsu [2] (entitled ‘Types of attackers’), describes
the two classes of attacker against which the protocol is intended to be ro-
bust, namely insider attackers and outside attackers. The paper states ‘The
insider attacker is a legitimate member who knows the group key . . . [and]
is able to impersonate other members in a secure group communication’.
As we show in section 3.4 below, precisely such an insider attack is possi-
ble. This contradicts the claim made ([2], section 2.2.2) that ‘none of these
attacks can work properly against our protocol’.
2.2 Related work
The Harn-Hsu protocol uses a combination of secret sharing and Diffie-
Hellman key agreement. The use of secret sharing as part of a group key
establishment protocol is long-established (see, for example, section 6.7.2 of
Boyd and Mathuria [1]). However, this approach is known to have short-
comings; in particular the following issue is described in [1].
However, when we look at the question of sending different ses-
sion keys over time there are some problems. A malicious princi-
pal who obtains one key gains information regarding the shares
of other principals . . .
As we describe below, a related problem arises with the Harn-Hsu scheme.
Indeed, the fact that the Harn-Hsu protocol has serious flaws is hardly sur-
prising given the unfortunate history of the area. Back in 2010, Harn and
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Lin [3] described a group key transfer protocol based on secret sharing which
is not only mathematically flawed, but also possesses very serious security
issues; this gave rise not only to a number of papers pointing out the flaws
(see, for example, [6, 7]), but also to further flawed protocols attempting to
‘fix’ these flaws. Some of the history of this domain can be found in the
recent paper of Liu et al [5].
2.3 The protocol
The following requirements apply for use of the protocol.
• The protocol is designed to work within a set U = {U1, U2, . . . , Un} of
n users.
• Integers p, q and g must be agreed by all members of U , where p is
a large prime (1024 bits is suggested), q is a prime factor of p − 1
(160 bits is suggested), and g (1 < g < p) is a generator of Zq. All
participants must also agree on a one-way hash-function h.
• Every user Ui must:
– have a unique identifier IDi (an integer satisfying 0 ≤ IDi ≤ q−1),
and
– choose a Diffie-Hellman private key xi ∈ Zq, and obtain a CA-
signed certificate for the associated public key yi = g
xi mod q.
Now suppose user Uw wishes to act as an initiator, and establish a new
secret key K between the members of a group of users U ′ (U ′ ⊆ U). Suppose
U ′ = {Uz1 , Uz2 , . . . , Uzℓ} for some ℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ n), where 1 ≤ zi ≤ n for every
i (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ).
Observe that we have made two minor changes to the notation of [2] to
avoid possible confusion. Harn and Hsu refer to the initiator as Us, but they
also use s to denote a ephemeral secret known only to the initiator. They
refer to the members of the group U ′ as {Ur1 , Ur2 , . . . , Urℓ}, but they then
use r to denote a function of the ephemeral secret s.
The initiator proceeds as follows.
1. The initiator selects a one-time (ephemeral) secret s ∈ Zq, and com-
putes r = gs mod q.
2. The initiator obtains trusted copies of the public keys yzi of every
member of U ′, e.g. by obtaining and verifying the relevant public key
certificates, and for every i (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) uses its own private key xw
and the ephemeral secret s to compute a one-time shared secret key
kzi = (y
xw+s
zi
mod p) mod q.
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3. The initiator uses Lagrange interpolation to determine a polynomial
f(x) of degree ℓ which passes through the following set of ℓ+1 points:
{(0,K), (IDz1 , kz1), (IDz2 , kz2), . . . , (IDzℓ , kzℓ)}
observing that the key K is treated here as an integer in Zq, i.e. the
choice of q constrains the length of the established key K.
4. The initiator chooses an arbitrary set S = {a1, a2, . . . , aℓ} of size ℓ,
where ai ∈ Zq for every i and S∩U
′ = ∅, and computes the ℓ+1 public
values (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (aℓ, f(aℓ)) and h(t||K), where t is a
timestamp.
5. The initiator now broadcasts r, t and the ℓ+ 1 public values
(a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (aℓ, f(aℓ)), h(t||K)
to all members of U ′.
On receipt of the broadcast, each user Uzi ∈ U
′ (1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ) proceeds as
follows.
1. Uzi recomputes the one-time secret key (shared with the initiator) as:
kzi = ((ryw)
xzi mod p) mod q.
2. Uzi uses Lagrange interpolation to recompute the polynomial f(x) of
degree ℓ, using the following set of ℓ+ 1 points:
{(IDzi , kzi), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (aℓ, f(aℓ))}.
Uzi can now recover K
′ = f(0).
3. Uzi verifies that the received timestamp t is sufficiently recent, com-
putes h(t||K ′), and checks that this equals the received hash value. If
so, the recomputed key K ′ is correct, i.e. K ′ = K, and can be used for
group communication.
2.4 Security claims
Amongst others, Harn and Hsu [2] make the following claims regarding the
security properties of the protocol.
1. The protocol provides key authentication. The meaning of this is
not made completely clear, but it would appear that (and following
common use of the term) this means that the group member can verify
that the key originates from the claimed initiator and that it is a
‘fresh’ key, i.e. it was sent by the initiator at the time indicated in the
timestamp t.
2. The security of the secret sharing encryption is unconditionally secure.
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3 Analysis
We now describe a number of serious issues with the protocol, including
cases where the protocol does not satisfy the security properties claimed of
it.
3.1 Missing information
We firstly observe that, apart from the abuses of notation observed above,
the specification is missing certain key elements, including the following.
• It is not explicitly stated that IDi must be an element of Zq.
• The message broadcast by the initiator must contain both the identifier
of the initiator and the identifiers of the members of the group U ′. If
the latter was not the case, then every user in U would be obliged to
attempt to obtain the key K, and will only discover they are not a
member of the group U ′ when the hash comparison fails. This would
impose a very significant unnecessary computational load on the global
user set. Moreover, the intended recipients would not know which
other users know the key, making its use problematic.
3.2 Unconditional security
It is claimed that ‘the security of the secret sharing encryption is uncon-
ditionally secure’ (see claim 2 of section 2.4). However, it is easy to see
that the only part of the scheme which can be considered as in any sense
unconditionally secure is the reconstruction of f . However, if the discrete
logarithm problem can be solved with respect to g in Zp, then clearly all user
private keys can be obtained from their public keys, meaning that anyone
with access to the relevant public keys can obtain K from a broadcast. That
is, in no sense is the encryption of K unconditionally secure.
3.3 Effects of compromise of a group key
Suppose a group key K is compromised, i.e. it becomes available to a mali-
cious partyM (insider or outsider), who also has access to the corresponding
broadcast message, i.e.:
r, t, h(t||K), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (aℓ, f(aℓ)).
M can now, at any time, choose a current timestamp, t′ say, and compute
h(t′||K). M can now impersonate the initator and sent the slightly modified
broadcast message:
r, t′, h(t′||K), (a1, f(a1)), (a2, f(a2)), . . . , (aℓ, f(aℓ)).
5
This will be accepted as valid by all the recipients of the original (valid)
broadcast, i.e. they will accept K as a newly generated, authentic key. This
attack can be repeated as many times as M wishes, i.e. M can force contin-
ued use of a compromised key indefinitely, breaking key authentication (i.e.
claim 1 of section 2.4).
3.4 Impersonation of an initiator
Suppose user Uzi is a valid recipient of a broadcast, i.e. Uzi ∈ U
′; then, since
Uzi can compute the polynomial f(x) used in this broadcast, Uzi can also
compute all the one-time secret keys
kz1 , kz2 , . . . , kzℓ
for members of the group U ′, simply by computing f(zj) for every j (1 ≤
j ≤ ℓ, j 6= i).
This information enables Uzi to impersonate the valid initiator in a
broadcast of a key chosen by Uzi to the original set of recipients (or any
subset of the original set of recipients) at any time. The attack works in the
following way.
1. Uzi chooses a new key K
∗ and a current timestamp t∗.
2. Uzi uses Lagrange interpolation to determine a polynomial f
∗(x) of
degree ℓ which passes through the following set of ℓ+ 1 points:
{(0,K∗), (IDz1 , kz1), (IDz2 , kz2), . . . , (IDzℓ , kzℓ)}.
3. Uzi now chooses a set S
∗ = {a∗1, a
∗
2, . . . , a
∗
ℓ} of size ℓ, where a
∗
i ∈
Zq for every i and S
∗ ∩ U ′ = ∅, and computes the ℓ + 1 values
(a∗1, f(a
∗
1)), (a
∗
2, f(a
∗
2)), . . . , (a
∗
ℓ , f(a
∗
ℓ)) and h(t
∗||K∗).
4. Finally Uzi impersonates the original initiator to broadcast r (taken
from the original valid broadcast), t∗ and the ℓ + 1 values computed
in the previous step to all members of U ′.
5. It is straightforward to verify that the broadcast will be accepted by
all members of the group U ′.
That is, at any time after the original broadcast, any of the recipients
of the broadcast can send a new broadcast message containing a new key
and timestamp to all the members of the original group, impersonating the
original initiator. This insider attack clearly breaks the key authentication
property (i.e. claim 1 of section 2.4), and is also clearly something that the
designers of the protocol did not intend to be possible since, as discussed in
section 2.1, insider attackers are part of the Harn-Hsu threat model.
Note that this attack relates to the observation made by Boyd and Math-
uria [1] regarding the security properties of key establishment protocols
based on secret sharing — see section 2.2.
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4 Conclusions
As demonstrated above, the protocol proposed by Harn and Hsu [2] fails to
possess the properties claimed of it. This means that the protocol should
not be used. It is important to observe that the Harn-Hsu paper does
not include a rigorous security proof using the state of the art ‘provable
security’ techniques, nor is there a formal model of security for the protocol.
This helps to explain why fundamental flaws exist. Indeed, the following
observation, made by Liu et al. [5] with respect to a number of previously
proposed but flawed group key establishment protocols, is hugely pertinent.
The security proof for each vulnerable GKD protocol only relies
on incomplete or informal arguments. It can be expected that
they would suffer from attacks.
It would, of course, be tempting to try to repair the protocol to address
the issues identified, but, unless a version can be devised with an accompa-
nying security proof, there is a strong chance that subtle flaws will remain.
Certainly the analysis necessary to find the flaws listed above was completed
in a couple of hours, and no attempt was made to discover all the possible
attacks.
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